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ARTICLES
A Practical Guide to Recent Developments
in Federal Habeas Corpus for Practicing
Attorneys
J. Thomas Sullivan*
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have dramatically
restricted the power of the United States District Courts to review state
court criminal convictions. The trend in the Court's decisions is to
elevate technical performance above substance in the evaluation of
claims of federal rights violations. This trend has resulted in an increased
demand upon state trial and appellate counsel to properly preserve and
develop both legal and factual grounds supporting claims of constitu-
tional error. The purpose of this article is to provide practitioners with
an overview of recent developments in federal habeas corpus law and
their impact on the conduct of state court criminal litigation and
subsequent federal habeas litigation.
Federal habeas corpus is, of course, a statutorily created remedy'
that may be expanded or restricted by legislative action. 2 However,
while Congress has disputed habeas corpus "reform" this past year
within debate over a comprehensive crime package,3 the Supreme Court
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; B.A.,
Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist; LL.M., Texas. This paper was originally presented at a
continuing legal education seminar sponsored by the Arkansas Institute of Continuing Legal
Education, "Laws Across the River," in Memphis, Tennessee, September 25, 1992.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
2. See, for example, Justice O'Connor's discussion of legislative action applicable to inter-
pretation of congressional intent with respect to a significant component (i.e., deference to state
fact-finding) of federal habeas review of state court judgments in part III of her dissenting opinion
in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1725-27 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3. The last congressional session included legislation approved by the House, H.R. 3371,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), and by the Senate, S. 2305, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), which
sought to limit state inmate access to federal review through the application for federal writ of
habeas corpus. The House version contained a provision particularly troubling to defense counsel
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has moved to implement its own set of "reforms," streamlining and,
in some sense, rationalizing the habeas corpus remedy.4 State trial,
appellate, and post-conviction counsel, as well as counsel representing
federal habeas petitioners, must be aware of the Court's approach to
federal relief to properly represent their clients in criminal matters.
Today, the federal habeas corpus remedy continues to allow many
defendants the option of seeking federal review of state court disposition
of their federal constitutional complaints.5 However, it contains nu-
merous pitfalls for unwary attorneys and their clients that serve prin-
cipally to frustrate litigation of meritorious claims. The focus of this
article is simply to alert counsel to the requirements that recent decisions
impose upon them and to suggest further dangers the writ may face in
cases on the docket for the October 1992 term.
The framework for discussion flows from a general characterization
of the remedy as it now exists: Generally, a state inmate may assert
claims of federal constitutional rights violations occurring during the
state court trial in a single petition in which all claims asserted have
previously been litigated in state proceedings. 6 The state court's appli-
cation of the bar of procedural default based on state procedural
grounds generally will serve to bar federal review of these federal
claims.7 The federal habeas court will dismiss successor petitions upon
assertion of the defense of abuse of the writ unless the petitioner can
demonstrate one of three things: (1) that failure to raise the claim
resulted from some cause external to or beyond his control, such as
prosecutorial misconduct; 8 (2) that he is actually innocent of the crime
for which he has been convicted; 9 or (3) that he is innocent of an
which would have required federal habeas courts to defer to state disposition of federal consti-
tutional claims rendered after full and fair adjudication. The Conference Committee report, H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 405, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1992), reflected the Senate version which omitted
the requirement of deference to state court determinations of federal constitutional claims rendered
after full and fair adjudication. The Congressional debate ended when the Senate failed to pass
the compromise bill, prompting the New York Times to decry a perceived lobbying effort by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in support of the Senate version. The High Court v. Habeas Corpus,
N.Y. TudEs, Jan. 4, 1992, at A18.
4. See Marcia Coyle, Back to the Future: The Justices Re-Examine the Habeas Corpus Writ,
14 NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 1, 52-53.
5. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (Federal habeas corpus is available
to review claims based on "disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the
writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights.").
6. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (holding state defendant's petition containing
exhausted and unexhausted claims must be dismissed by federal habeas court).
7. Coleman v. Thompson, 11 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 87 (1977).
8. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470-71 (1991).
9. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
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aggravating circumstance supporting imposition of the death sentence. 0
Finally, once state court litigation has resulted in creation of a factual
record on the claim, the federal habeas court will be bound by that
record unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the failure."
This virtually requires a showing that state officials have deprived the
petitioner of a fair opportunity to develop the evidentiary record
necessary to support the claim because default by the petitioner or his
counsel will not suffice to establish "cause" in these circumstances. 2
To properly preserve the criminal defendant's ultimate option of
filing for federal review, defense counsel must be cognizant of the
procedural context in which claims of federal violations must be pre-
sented at each stage in the litigation.
A. Preservation of Federal Constitutional Error in State Trials
The provision of effective assistance of counsel includes the duty
placed upon the defense lawyer to preserve claims of error for appellate
review.' 3 Counsel discharges this duty by asserting a claim of violation
of constitutional guarantees, statutory rights, or directives of procedural
rules.' 4 Typically, these claims may be asserted in the pre-trial process
by written motion; 5 by interposing a timely objection during the course
of trial to the admission 6 or exclusion of evidence or to restriction of
examination; 17 or by objecting to improper argument.
10. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19 (1992) (noting that inmate sentenced to
death may raise claims in successor petition only if inmate can meet cause and prejudice test or
can demonstrate that he is "innocent" of factor used to impose death penalty).
11. Id. at 2518-19 (holding that inmate sentenced to death may raise claims in successor
petition only if inmate can meet cause and prejudice test or can demonstrate that he is "innocent"
of factor used to impose death penalty).
12. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1986) (holding ineffective
assistance claim may be predicated on counsel's failure to seek exclusion of illegally seized
evidence).
14. For example, in State v. Roper, the court held that a trial court must grant severance of
counts in the indictment upon timely motion when severance is required by procedural rule. 682
P.2d 464, 466-68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
15. The defendant's failure to move to quash or dismiss a defective indictment pursuant to
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5 results in a waiver of any attack on the sufficiency of
the charging instrument on appeal. State v. Rupp, 586 P.2d 1302, 1308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
16. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 533 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Ariz. 1975) (holding trial court erred
in admitting statements relating to collateral matters for use in impeaching defense witness).
17. See, e.g., State v. Melendez, 588 P.2d 294, 296-97 (Ariz. 1978) (holding trial court
improperly restricted cross-examination as to witness's motive to testify to avoid death penalty
prosecution).
18. See, e.g., State v. Ikirt, 770 P.2d 1159, 1164-65 (Ariz. 1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872
(1989) (holding prosecutor's remarks concerning defendant's statements to his mother improperly
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Preservation of certain claims may require the filing of post-judgment
motions. Examples include motions for new trial based on jury mis-
conduct during deliberations, 9 or prosecutorial misconduct such as
suppression of favorable evidence or reliance on perjured testimony. 20
Often, facts supporting this type of claim are disclosed to defense
counsel only after conviction, despite exercise of due diligence. 21 Re-
gardless of the nature of the claim, or the basis upon which the right
is asserted, the most general rule of preservation of error is that claims
not timely submitted for ruling by the trial court are deemed waived-
subject to an exception for fundamental or plain error recognized in
some jurisdictions. 2
The same general rules apply to preservation of federal constitutional
claims and claims arising under federal laws or treaties, the only class
of claims subject to litigation by application for the federal writ of
habeas corpus by state criminal defendants. 2 Because such claims are
almost inextricably interwoven in the state investigative and trial process,
commented on defendant's decision not to testify); State v. Van Den Berg, 791 P.2d 1075, 1079-
80 (Ariz. Ct. App.), review denied (1990) (holding that prosecutor erred in arguing personal
opinion of guilt, but error waived because of lack of objection).
19. See State v. Hansen, 751 P.2d 951, 955-56 (Ariz. 1988) (holding brief discussion of
defendant's prior trial during deliberations inconsequential because verdict not mentioned); State
v. Aguilar, 818 P.2d 165, 165-67 (Ariz. Ct. App.), review denied (1991) (motion for new trial
proper vehicle for asserting claim of jury misconduct based on reception of information or
evidence from outside sources during trial or deliberations).
20. See generally State v. Fowler, 422 P.2d 125, 128 (Ariz. 1967) (failure to disclose knife
found at scene of homicide constitutes misconduct because state's theory at trial was that deceased
was unarmed). But see State v. Taylor, 537 P.2d 938, 954 (Ariz. 1975) (holding claims of
subornation of perjury should be presented in collateral proceeding and not by motion for new
trial; claim of newly discovered evidence is proper ground for motion for new trial).
21. For example, in State v. Van Den Berg, the court held that the defendant exercised due
diligence in employing an investigator who learned of witness's prior juvenile record after the
trial, when the prosecution had previously represented that the testifying witness had no prior
record, and defense counsel had relied on the prosecutor's representations. 791 P.2d 1075, 1077-
79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
22. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize reviewability of some
unobjected-to errors in particularly egregious situations, providing, in pertinent part:
(b) Plain error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
FED. R. Cam. P. 52(b). Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
FED. R. EvtD. 103(d).
23. A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
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state criminal proceedings provide an appropriate forum for initial
litigation of many of the most significant federal constitutional issues.24
Counsel must be cognizant of those protections afforded state criminal
defendants by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Preservation of federal
constitutional error requires timely assertion of these claims in language
adequate to alert state trial and appellate judges of the source of
authority upon which counsel and the accused intend to rely in pressing
these claims.25
Generally, defense counsel should be aware that preservation of error
for federal habeas purposes involves consideration of a number of
factors that affect the conduct of the state trial, the direct appeal, and
any state post-conviction litigation that precedes the federal petition. 26
1. State Procedural Rules and Preservation of Federal Claims
At the outset, defense counsel must recognize that preservation of
federal constitutional error is governed by state procedural rules relating
to timely and adequate assertion of error at trial. 27 Federal rights
violations may substantially prejudice the rights of the client, often
outweighing the prejudice created by other investigative and trial error.
However, the significance of the rights violation, when established, will
not alter the requirements for proper preservation of error. 28 Last term,
24. As the Court observed:
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country. In
1982, more than 12 million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic charges)
were filed in the 50 state court systems and the District of Columbia. See 7 State
Court Journal, No. 1, p. 18 (1983). By comparison, approximately 32,700 criminal
suits were filed in federal courts during that same year. See Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 6 (1982). The state
courts are required to apply federal constitutional standards, and they necessarily
create a considerable body of "federal law" in the process. It is not surprising that
this Court has become more interested in the application and development of federal
law by state courts in light of the recent significant expansion of federally created
standards that we have imposed on the States.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 n.8 (1983).
25. In fact, subsections (b) and (c) of § 2254 mandate that state court defendants first assert
federal claims in their state court proceedings.
26. Arizona provides that defendants may initiate state post-conviction litigation after con-
clusion of the direct appeal to assert claims that could not have been litigated on direct appeal.
Atuz. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; State v. Williams, 819 P.2d 962, 964 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
ineffective assistance claims should be raised collaterally under Rule 32, rather than by motion
for new trial).
27. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
28. The only recognized exceptions to the preservation requirement involve error that con-
tributes to the conviction of an innocent person, resulting in a fundamental miscarriage of justice;
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in Coleman v. Thompson,29 the Court affirmed its basic commitment
to respect for orderly state process. The Court held that if a state court
applies the bar of procedural default when initially presented with a
federal constitutional claim, federal courts will subsequently be barred
from consideration of the claim.30
State trial counsel's failure to preserve federal constitutional claims
will not be excused unless counsel's representation is constitutionally
deficient under the standard for Sixth Amendment effectiveness an-
nounced in Strickland v. Washington." Prior to Coleman and its
predecessor, Wainwright v. Sykes, 32 the Court in Fay v. Noia13 had
held that counsel's failure could serve as cause for a federal habeas
court to disregard state procedural default rules and reach the issue on
the merits, unless the failure resulted from a deliberate attempt to
bypass state procedure in favor of pursuing relief by federal habeas
corpus.3 4 However, in Coleman, the Court expressly overruled Fay v.
Noia in rejecting reliance on this doctrine of "deliberate bypass." 31
In Murray v. Carrier, 36 the Court concluded that a showing that
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance to a state court
defendant may serve to excuse state procedural default.3 7 Thus, the net
effect of recent decisions is likely to increase the stakes for trial counsel
in effectively representing state court defendants because counsel cannot
avoid application of the procedural bar short of a showing of ineffec-
tiveness. 38 Consequently, the need to assert a claim of constitutional
ineffectiveness to save a procedurally defaulted claim from the Coleman
bar may become apparent in more cases.
State defense counsel must, therefore, be aware that failure to pre-
serve an accused's federal constitutional claims will bar those claims
that results from factors beyond the control of the defendant and counsel, such as misconduct
on the part of the state; or that results from ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). Competent counsel's mere inadvertent failure to preserve error or
to recognize a legally meritorious issue is not sufficient to warrant relief from the procedural
default. Id. at 487-88.
29. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
30. Id. at 2565.
31. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
32. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
33. 372 U.S. 391, 437-39 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2564-
65 (1991).
34. 372 U.S. at 437-39.
35. 111 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
36. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
37. Id. at 492.
38. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 487-88. Mere inadvertence or strategic error made by competent
counsel is insufficient to avoid the bar of procedural default. Id.
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from federal habeas review if state appellate courts apply procedural
rules to hold those claims defaulted.3 9 The Court has provided only the
route of asserting ineffective assistance of counsel to avoid procedural
bar to federal review of those claims, 4° except in circumstances where
refusal to review the federal claim would result in a miscarriage of
justice, such as conviction of an innocent defendant.4 ' Thus, trial and
appellate counsel should be prepared to properly defend their clients'
federal constitutional rights at all steps of state proceedings to avoid
being accused of ineffectiveness later.
2. Assertion of State Law Claims
Consideration of state law claims, whether grounded in state consti-
tutional guarantees, statutory provisions, or rules, is not within the
jurisdiction of federal reviewing courts. 42 State court counsel must,
however, be concerned about proper preservation of these claims. 43 The
development of independent state law grounds for disposition of crim-
inal procedure complaints has seen rapid and widespread growth over
39. Moreover, in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the Court rejected the argument that a state appellate
court not expressly addressing a claim of federal rights violation impliedly refused the claim on
the merits. Ill S. Ct. 2590, 2594 (1991). The state court of appeals decision indicated that that
court had refused to consider the federal claim because of procedural default. Id. at 2593. The
United States Supreme Court held that, absent a subsequent express consideration and disposition
of the federal claim on the merits, a federal habeas court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
See id. at 2594-96. The Court declined to consider the silent state appellate opinion as presumptively
disposing of the federal claim on the merits. Id.
40. For example, in Smith v. Murray, the Court held that competent counsel's decision not
to raise an issue regarding admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony was a matter of strategy
that would not excuse application of a procedural default bar by the state appellate courts. 477
U.S. 527, 534-35 (1986). Ultimately, the state procedural default precluded federal review of the
claim that the evidence had been admitted in violation of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 533-34.
41. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
42. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780-81 (1990) (holding that federal court may review
violations of state law only insofar as they raise federal claims; rejecting claim that the Arizona
Supreme Court had incorrectly applied state law in relating evidence to aggravating circumstance
charged).
43. See, e.g., State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1326 (Ariz. 1984). Confronted by federal
constitutional law rejecting the contention that jury sentencing in capital cases was mandated by
the Eighth Amendment, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), defense counsel presented the
jury sentencing argument as one arising under the state constitution. Id. at 1326. The Arizona
Supreme Court rejected the claim that the Arizona constitutional right to jury trial included in
article 2, § 23, incorporated jury sentencing in capital cases because jury sentencing in capital
cases was the practice at the time of adoption of state constitution. Id. Instead, the court held
that the constitutional guarantee simply incorporated the common law right to jury trial, which
included jury consideration only of the question of the accused's guilt or innocence. Id. The court
thus upheld the judge-imposed sentence of death in the case. Id.
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the past decade. State 44 and federal4" jurists, practitioners, and
commentators46 have lamented an apparent retreat from the posture of
expansion of individual rights often claimed to characterize the Warren
Court, but probably also accurately reflecting majorities of the early
Burger Court. Disposition of claims on state law grounds has proved
the most important vehicle for avoiding further retrenchment on the
part of the Supreme Court, particularly in individual cases, because
expansion of state law grounds for decision has deprived the Court of
jurisdiction to reverse determinations that are favorable to criminal
defendants.
In response to state appellate court activism, the Supreme Court in
Michigan v. Long 7 established a doctrine of presumptive jurisdiction
to review state court determinations of federal constitutional claims 48
that either rest directly on interpretation of the federal charter or draw
upon federal authority, even when those claims do not rest expressly
on federal constitutional decisions, as a basis for decision.49 Unless a
44. See generally Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, Double Security of Federalism:
Protecting Individual Liberty Under the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 115 (1988);
Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions
and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491 (1984). Authors
Feldman and Utter were serving as justices on the Arizona and Washington Supreme Courts,
respectively, at the time their articles were published,
45. See generally William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HAsv. L. REv. 489 (1977) (written while former Associate Justice William Brennan
was still a member of the Supreme Court). In addition, see Justice Brennan's foreword to the
Symposium on the Arizona Constitution, 20 Aiz. ST. L.J. i (1988).
46. See, e.g., Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-A way from a Reac-
tionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 1, 2 (1981); Paul Marcus, State Constitutional
Protection for Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 151, 171-76 (1988) (focusing
on developments in Arizona state constitutional law); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 421-26 (1973-
74).
47. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
48. Id. at 1041.
49. In pre-Long decisions, the Court had concluded that the failure of a state appellate
opinion to expressly base its ruling on state law sources when disposing of a claim arising under
both federal and state constitutions would afford the Court a basis for review. For example, in
Delaware v. Prouse, the Court concluded that, although the Delaware Supreme Court's reference
to both state and federal constitutions might have been construed to show that the decision rested
on non-federal sources of law, that intent was not clearly present in the language of the decision.
440 U.S. 648 (1979). Thus, the Supreme Court proceeded with review on the merits. Id. at 651-
52. Similarly, in Oregon v. Hass, the Court concluded that the state court relied on federal
precedent in determining admissibility of a confession because the lower court's opinion cited no
sources of state law, and the Court proceeded with review. 420 U.S. 714, 719-20 (1975). And in
Oregon v. Kennedy, the Court declined to find that the state court's disposition actually rested
on independent state grounds where the state precedent cited relied on interpretation of federal
constitutional guarantees. 456 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1982).
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reviewing state court expressly relies upon state law as an adequate and
independent basis for decision, 0 a ruling favorable to the accused may
ultimately be reversed by Supreme Court intervention. Of course, this
action will necessarily occur on writ of certiorari to the state court filed
by the prosecution," and not on writ of habeas corpus, because the
right to apply for habeas relief belongs only to an inmate in custody
as a result of the state conviction. 2 Nevertheless, because counsel must
be aware of the need to insulate favorable appellate rulings from further
review on petition by the state, it is important for state trial and
appellate counsel to assert and urge as independent theories for review
the federal and state law provisions upon which the accused can
arguably rely.
The utility of asserting both federal and state constitutional claims
is demonstrated by the Michigan Supreme Court's recent disposition of
a state constitutional claim. In Harmelin v. Michigan,3 the United
States Supreme Court determined that a mandatory life sentence im-
posed for possession of certain quantities of controlled substances did
not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.14 The Court's decision overruled its prior holding in Solem
v. Helm55 because the majority concluded that the Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis relied upon by the court below was not grounded
in sound constitutional doctrine . 6 Instead, the majority held that the
Eighth Amendment did not prohibit imposition of a life sentence for
the offense under consideration. 7
Subsequently, however, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that
the state constitution did, in fact, prohibit imposition of such a dis-
proportionate penalty, affording the defendant relief in People v.
50. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 ("If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that
it is alternatively based on bona fide, separate, adequate, and independent state grounds, we, of
course, will not undertake to review the decision.").
51. For example, the State sought review in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Oregon
v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); and Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides that federal courts "shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States." (emphasis added).
53. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
54. Id. at 2701-02.
55. 463 U.S. 277, 284-88, 303 (1983) (holding that life sentence without possibility of parole
for recidivist whose prior convictions were all for property or petty crimes was "disproportionate"
under the Eighth Amendment).
56. 111 S. Ct. at 2686-99.
57. Id. at 2701-02.
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Bullock. 8 Thus, by asserting both state and federal claims as inde-
pendent grounds for disposition, counsel for the accused effectively
may preclude a federal determination that would deprive the client of
relief initially granted by state appellate courts.
B. Presentation and Litigation of Federal Claims
To fully preserve federal claims for review by writ of habeas corpus,
counsel in state proceedings must urge these claims on direct appeal,
or, where appropriate, by state post-conviction writ.5 9 The requirement
that counsel include these claims in state appellate proceedings imposes
a significant burden on appellate counsel obligated to develop a suc-
cessful strategy for the appeal. Unless all federal claims are carried
forward on direct appeal, or by post-conviction writ, 60 counsel must
assume the risk that they will be barred from review by application of
either the Coleman bar of procedural default or the rule of Rose v.
Lundy A precluding federal court review of unexhausted federal claims.
1. Assertion of Federal Claims on State Direct Appeal
Clearly, counsel not only must preserve error by interposing timely
objections during the pre-trial and trial process where violations of
federally protected rights are implicated, but also must obtain a ruling
from both the trial and appellate courts on the merits of the claim.
Failure to press an objection or motion to formal ruling ultimately may
result in a procedural bar to consideration of the claim when raised on
direct appeal, while failure to press the claim on appeal may also result
in a waiver of the contention, barring further review.62
58. 485 N.W.2d 866, 872-77 (Mich. 1992).
59. Typically, the type of claim counsel may more appropriately assert by state post-conviction
writ involves a matter that may not be fully developed factually in the appellate record, such as
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 390-91 (1986);
accord, State v. Williams, 819 P.2d. 962, 964 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that claim of
ineffective assistance should be raised collaterally, rather than by motion for new trial).
60. Once a claim has been litigated to a ruling on the merits in a state direct appeal, the
defendant need not reassert the same claim in state post-conviction proceedings to exhaust state
remedies before presenting the claim in an application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953).
61. 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
62. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) ("We now make [the rule]
explicit: In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").
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State appellate counsel's obligation to provide effective assistance
does not require counsel to present every conceivable, or even every
colorable, issue for disposition on direct appeal.63 The Supreme Court
rejected the notion that an indigent accused was entitled to have all
colorable claims litigated, even upon direct request to counsel, in Jones
v. Barnes.64 There, the majority noted the practice of presenting only
those claims most likely to prove successful on direct appeal as a
recognized tactic in making the most effective possible presentation of
the case. 65 The Court reasoned that inclusion of points of error having
little likelihood of success might well serve to distract an appellate court
from the more persuasive grounds, or to dilute the impact of these
potentially more successful points in the presentation. 6 Thus, the Court
concluded that the strategy to be employed on direct appeal is to be
determined by counsel in the exercise of counsel's professional judg-
ment, rather than dictated by a seemingly non-professional preference
of the client.
67
Jones v. Barnes poses the problem that, in culling the points of error,
counsel may jeopardize the client's opportunity for federal review of
meritorious claims by concluding that certain claims are less likely to
prove successful than other claims. 6 If those claims deemed most likely
to succeed do fail to result in relief, then the client has lost the
opportunity to pursue federal claims which might otherwise prove
meritorious.
63. However, a refusal to present a colorable claim urged by the defendant may subject
counsel to a claim of ineffectiveness in the appellate representation. United States ex rel. Winters
v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (N.D. I1. 1983); see also United States ex rel. Winters
v. Mizell, 644 F. Supp. 782, 792-93 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (subsequent disposition of the DeRobertis
case, 568 F. Supp. at 1484, under a different name after denial of original writ for failure to
exhaust state remedies).
64. 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983).
65. Id. at 752-53. Chief Justice Burger referred to a number of prominent authorities in the
field of appellate practice in observing that inclusion of all colorable claims in the brief on appeal
tends to dilute the strength of the overall presentation and may obscure those claims most likely
meritorious. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 TEMP.
L.Q. 115, 119 (1951); see ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATEs 226-27
(2d ed. 1989); John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (Dec. 1940);
John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes - Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw.
L.J. 801, 809 (1976).
66. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753.
67. Id. at 751-54.
68. This type of strategic error on the part of otherwise competent counsel in assessing the
likely merits of potential claims on appeal probably will prove fatal to attempts to seek federal
review if the state appellate courts affirm. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1986)
(holding that procedural default resulting from deliberate decision not to pursue claim of error
will not be excused if counsel was otherwise competent).
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The classic example of strategic error in the presentation of federal
claims is illustrated by the procedural history of the constitutional claim
in Caldwell v. Mississippi.69 There, trial counsel in a capital case had
objected to an improper prosecutorial argument that deemphasized the
sentencing jury's role in the process.70 In effect, the prosecutor told the
jurors that if they erred in imposing the death sentence, that error
would be corrected on appeal.7'
The issue was not urged on direct appeal. 72 However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court alluded to the issue, concluding that the argument either
was not improper, or if improper, was not sufficiently harmful to
warrant reversal. 73 The United States Supreme Court then addressed
the issue on Caldwell's petition for writ of certiorari, and a majority
of the Court concluded that the argument contributed to imposition of
a death sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.7 4 Thus, a claim
that the state -court could have deemed defaulted because appellate
counsel decided not to pursue the issue on direct appeal ultimately
proved meritorious. The result suggests the value of presenting and
urging all issues that raise claims of federal rights violations-particu-
larly in capital cases.75
2. The Importance of a Disposition of the Federal Claim
Caldwell demonstrates not only the potential disaster in applying the
Jones majority's advice without deference to rules regarding preserva-
tion of federal claims, but also the significance of obtaining a ruling
on the merits of the federal claim in state proceedings. Unless a state
court simply refuses to consider a federal issue or fails to address a
properly preserved federal claim on its merits,7 6 failure to obtain a
69. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
70. Id. at 324-25.
71. Id. at 325-26 (The prosecutor also stated his belief that automatic review of the death
sentence by the state supreme court was "unfair.").
72. Id. at 326-27.
73. Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 807 (Miss. 1983).
74. 472 U.S. at 341.
75. The Caldwell Court observed that the Mississippi Supreme Court had adopted a policy
of relaxing application of the procedural default rule in capital cases. Id. at 327-28. The federal
Constitution clearly did not mandate this relaxation of procedural rules, as the Court's opinion
in Coleman v. Thompson demonstrates. III S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991). In Coleman, the Court
held that the state procedural default bar precluded federal review of constitutional claims, even
in a capital case in which the death penalty had been imposed. Id. at 2565.
76. A state court decision that fails to dispose of a federal claim when timely and properly
presented may prove sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the habeas court under Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1989). The Harris Court recognized a presumption of rejection of
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ruling on the federal claim in a state trial court may result in a state
procedural bar eventually precluding federal habeas review. 77 Generally,
the issue being reviewed by federal courts focuses only indirectly on
the actual violation; instead, review focuses on the holding below in
terms of its correct resolution of the federal claim. 78 In Caldwell, review
in the United States Supreme Court was predicated on the sua sponte
holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court, rather than on error asserted
or argued on direct appeal. 79 Had the Mississippi court never addressed
the issue, the Supreme Court likely would not have considered the
error, no matter how egregious.8 0
Even when state procedural preservation rules have been violated by
failure to timely object or to file an appropriate motion, a ruling on
the merits of an otherwise defaulted federal claim is still possible in
many jurisdictions through application of a doctrine of fundamental
or plain error.' Justice Stevens recently highlighted the significance of
the claim on the merits by the state court, fulfilling the requirement for exhaustion of the claim.
Id. Under the federal habeas statute, a state court's refusal to even consider a contention that a
state defendant's federal rights had been violated virtually frees the defendant from further state
litigation prior to initiating an application for federal habeas corpus, unless state law provides a
vehicle for review of the decision not to address the federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)
(1988).
77. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 793 P.2d 559, 560 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that even
constitutional claims may be waived by procedural defects in suppression motion).
78. Consequently, harmless error rules are applicable in assessing proper disposition of federal
claims by state courts. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892-94 (1991) (applying
harmless error rule to question of improper shifting of burden in jury instructions).
79. 472 U.S. at 341.
80. See Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2120 n.** (1992) (holding that disposition of
petitioner's federal claim by state court's application of procedural default bar deprives Supreme
Court of jurisdiction to hear merits of federal claim).
81. See, e.g., State v. Gamble, 523 P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974) (recognizing as fundamental
only error which "goes to the foundation of the case, or takes from the defendant a right essential
to his defense"); State v. Smith, 665 P.2d 995, 999 (Ariz. 1983) (declining to hold that improper
reference to matters outside the trial record by the prosecutor in closing argument constituted
fundamental error subject to review in absence of timely objection); State v. Libberton, 685 P.2d
1284, 1290 (Ariz. 1984) (affirming existence of limited doctrine of fundamental error in Arizona
trials); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4035 (1989) (requiring state supreme court in capital
case in which death penalty imposed to review for fundamental error); State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d
1312, 1327 (Ariz. 1984); cf. State v. Martin, 686 P.2d 937, 941-42 (N.M. 1984); State v. Ramirez,
648 P.2d 307, 308 (N.M. 1982) (holding that improper comment on accused's decision to remain
silent constitutes fundamental error reviewable even in absence of contemporaneous trial objection);
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (applying fundamental error
doctrine to unobjected to error in jury instructions where error prejudicial). This type of error
may be characterized as jurisdictional or plain error. See FED. R. EVID. 103(d) (recognizing
doctrine of plain error in matters of admission or exclusion of evidence). But see, Pharo v. State,
783 S.W.2d 64, 67-68 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (following Wicks v. State, 606 S.W.2d 366, 369-70
(Ark. 1980), holding that Arkansas does not recognize a doctrine of fundamental or plain error).
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these doctrines in his concurring opinion in Sochor v. Florida.8 2 There,
the majority held that a failure to preserve federal error through timely
objection to an instruction given to the capital defendant's sentencing
jury deprived the Court of jurisdiction to review one of the grounds
urged for reversal.83 Justice Stevens observed that Florida applies a
doctrine of fundamental error permitting consideration of issues not
preserved which raise concerns about due process violations. He noted
that the Florida court did not specifically address the issues presented,
but observed that the issues not preserved were without merit. He
concluded, therefore, that the state supreme court had actually held
that the issues were not meritorious, rather than that they were pro-
cedurally barred from review. 8
Although Justice Stevens's position was not adopted by a majority
of the Court, his separate opinion does point to the significance of the
role of fundamental error in the preservation process. Appellate counsel
must not only take care not to dismiss preserved federal claims deemed
unlikely to succeed but also should specifically consider urging all
claims suggesting due process violations for disposition on the merits
in those jurisdictions in which fundamental or plain error doctrines are
viable. Once the state court rules on the merits of the federal claim,
the federal issue has been preserved for purposes of a later determination
by federal courts of the correctness of the disposition.16
3. Ineffective Assistance Claims
Many of the legitimate claims that defendants convicted in state
proceedings may raise in federal habeas involve questions about either
the competence or the dedication of their state court counsel.8 7 Thus,
Interestingly, although the Arkansas courts have refused to recognize a doctrine of plain or
fundamental error in appellate opinions, the Supreme Court included a plain error provision in
adopting Arkansas Rule of Evidence 103(d).
82. 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2125-28 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Frank v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 363 (1992) (Stevens, J.) (noting suitability of plain
error rule and addressing trial court's failure to instruct jury that an acquittal on the ground of
insanity would not preclude continuing detention if the defendant remained dangerous in opinion
on denial of certiorari).
83. 112 S. Ct. at 2119-20.
84. Id. at 2127.
85. Id. at 2127-28 (especially n.7).
86. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989) (If the last state court to be presented with a
particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal court review that might
otherwise have been available.).
87. See, e.g., State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1324-25 (Ariz. 1984) (rejecting claim of
ineffective assistance in capital trial based on counsel's failure to develop mitigating circumstances
330
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proper litigation of these claims is essential for purposes of preserving
them for federal review.
The right to effective assistance of counsel flows from the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel and extends to both the
trial88 and direct appeal89 in state court. Evaluation of counsel's per-
formance, however, often requires reviewing counsel to look beyond
the record of trial to assess claims that trial counsel failed to properly
investigate the case or neglected to present viable defenses. 90 Because a
sufficient factual record to evaluate performance will often require post-
trial proceedings, the Supreme Court recognized in Kimmelman v.
Morrison9' that ineffective assistance claims most often require collateral
attack, rather than development on direct appeal on the trial record
itself, even though some claims clearly can be discerned from the
record.
92
Consequently, counsel undertaking a direct appeal, state post-convic-
tion writ, or federal habeas application must be aware of the need to
evaluate the performance of those attorneys who previously have rep-
resented the client. 93 For many attorneys, this duty to consider prior
performance may be distasteful, particularly when the client demanding
review of counsel's performance is either factually guilty or personally
non-engaging. Nevertheless, to fully and fairly represent the client,
counsel may need to undertake an objective evaluation of prior counsel's
performance despite the unsatisfactory posture that successor counsel
may experience in the role. 94 This duty is particularly important in
evidence, such as client's age, family ties, and lack of intent to kill; those facts probably would
not have resulted in different result because trial court was aware of factors prior to sentencing).
But see State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 190-92 (La. 1992) (holding counsel ineffective in failing
to prepare mitigation defense in death penalty prosecution), cert. granted, No. 92-5129 (Oct. 19,
1992).
88. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
89. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967).
90. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in capital case in failing to investigate and develop mitigating circumstances
evidence of defendant's mental retardation).
91. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
92. See, e.g., State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1324-25 (Ariz. 1984) (rejecting claim of
ineffectiveness on direct appeal even though record disclosed facts sufficient to demonstrate
counsel's failure to develop mitigating circumstances where this evidence would not have affected
outcome because trial court was already aware of mitigating factors).
93. The Arizona Supreme Court has observed that, when an appointing court is advised that
ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel may prove an issue on appeal, the better practice
requires appointment of different counsel to prosecute the appeal. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d
1017, 1037 (Ariz. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
94. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-8.6
(directing successor counsel to investigate and raise claims of ineffectiveness in representation
rendered by prior counsel when warranted by facts).
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capital cases, where deficiency in performance may afford the accused
the only avenue for relief from a death sentence. 95
The duty to assert ineffectiveness is not itself free of considerations
extraneous to the actual question of performance. For example, al-
though state defendants are entitled, under the Sixth Amendment, to
effective assistance of counsel at trial96 and on direct appeal, 97 the
Supreme Court has made clear that no comparable right exists in the
prosecution of post-conviction, collateral actions, such as habeas corpus,
in either state or federal courts. 9 Consequently, counsel's defective
performance in post-conviction matters is not a ground for relief
because, in the absence of a guarantee to assistance of counsel, there
is no concomitant guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 99 Thus,
although ineffectiveness at the trial and direct appeal stages may serve
either to afford an independent basis for relief or to excuse a failure
to properly present meritorious claims, ineffectiveness in the post-
conviction stage of litigation serves only to preclude review of claims
that might otherwise have afforded relief.
The Court's current term has demonstrated that counsel's trial error
may ultimately create lengthy litigation over effectiveness, even when
the claim is rejected on the merits. In Lockhart v. Fretwell,'°° the Court
considered a bizarre factual claim of ineffectiveness. Trial counsel,
representing a state capital defendant, had failed to assert recent Eighth
Circuit authority'0 ' holding that the statutory aggravating circumstance
relating to pecuniary gain could not be predicated on the same robbery
95. In State v. Roscoe, the court considered and rejected a claim of ineffective assistance in
a capital context based on trial counsel's failure to develop and argue evidence of mitigating
circumstances during the punishment hearing. 700 P.2d 1312, 1324-25 (Ariz. 1984). These mitigating
circumstances, which included the defendant's age, his family ties, and his arguable lack of intent
to kill during the commission of a felony, were known to the trial court, however. The Arizona
Supreme Court concluded that counsel should have developed more effectively the defense case
in sentencing. Nevertheless, any failure of performance did not result in a verdict prejudicing the
capital defendant's rights and, thus, the second prong of the test for ineffectiveness set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984), was not met.
96. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
97. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967).
98. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1989) (holding no constitutional right to assistance
of counsel in post-conviction actions, even when death penalty imposed in state trial); Pennsylvania
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554-59 (1987) (holding no constitutional right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings, although state may provide for appointment of counsel). Consequently,
defective performance of counsel in post-conviction actions does not result in a constitutional
deprivation, and federal review does not lie to evaluate effectiveness claims. Coleman v. Thompson,
IIl S. Ct. 2546, 2567-68 (1991).
99. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
100. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
101. Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
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underlying the capital offense because the aggravating circumstance
unconstitutionally duplicated an element of the underlying felony. 10 2
Subsequently, in Lowenfield v. Phelps,103 the Court rejected a similar
argument of constitutionally impermissible duplication of an aggravating
circumstance and offense element in a Louisiana prosecution. The
Eighth Circuit than recognized Lowenfield as reversing its holding in
Collins by implication.' °4
The precise issue presented in Fretwell involved whether the state
court defendant could prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel in failing to preserve error when it was not clear that he would
have obtained relief on direct appeal had the error been preserved. 105
The State conceded that trial counsel's performance was deficient,
focusing its argument instead on the lack of prejudice demonstrated by
the claim1 6"
Holding that the sentencing proceeding was "neither unfair nor
unreliable,"' 7 the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that
relief was appropriate. 08 Petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of
Collins despite the subsequent holdings in Lowenfield and Perry v.
Lockhart.1°9 Had counsel preserved the Collins objection, he might well
have benefitted from the trial court's decision to comply with the
holding there,"10 or he might have prevailed in the state supreme court
had that court elected to follow that Eighth Circuit precedent."' But,
102. Id. The state supreme court rejected the attack on direct appeal because counsel failed
to preserve the error by objecting to the use of the aggravating circumstance in the sentencing
phase of the trial. Fretwell v. State, 708 S.W.2d 630 (Ark. 1986) (affirming conviction and death
sentence). The state court also rejected a post-conviction challenge of ineffective counsel based
on counsel's failure to assert the Collins claim at trial. Fretwell v. State, 728 S.W.2d 180, 181
(Ark. 1987).
103. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
104. Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
105. 113 S. Ct. at 841.
106. Id. at 842 n.l.
107. Id. at 843.
108. Id. at 845.
109. Id. at 844. Indeed, the majority essentially endorsed Perry as correctly decided, relying
on Fretwell's failure to assert that Collins remained viable despite Lowenfield's rejection of the
identical reasoning. See id. at 843 n.4. Because Fretwell did not argue this point, however, the
majority premised its consideration of the merits of the Collins/Perry dispute on the Eighth
Circuit's conclusion that Collins had in fact been overruled by Lowenfield. Id.
110. Id. at 843.
111. See id. at 842. The Fretwell majority noted that a majority of the Eighth Circuit panel
that concluded that Fretwell was entitled to relief on his ineffectiveness claim believed the state
supreme court to have been bound by Eighth Circuit precedent on a matter of federal constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 842. Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, specifically argued that state
supreme courts are not bound to follow United States Circuit Court precedents, even in matters
of federal constitutional construction, under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 846.
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according to the majority, the sentencing proceeding involved no prej-
udice because the outcome was neither unfair nor unreliable as a result
of counsel's failure to assert a claim ultimately shown not to have
existed for petitioner's benefit." 12
Even though Fretwell did not ultimately obtain relief on his claim of
ineffective counsel, the extensive litigation turned on factors external
to that performance. Both the State and the Supreme Court readily
agreed that trial counsel performed deficiently. The absence of legally
demonstrable prejudice, the second prong of the Strickland v.
Washington' test for determining when deficient performance results
in a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel, eventually doomed Fretwell's claim. Irrespective of the final
outcome, counsel's performance was weighed and found deficient
throughout the course of extensive state and federal proceedings.
Thus, once meritorious constitutional claims are raised for federal
review, proper representation in state proceedings ultimately rewards
counsel, as well as the client. Adequate preservation of these claims
facilitates review on the merits without reliance on accompanying as-
sertions of ineffectiveness to properly invoke the habeas jurisdiction of
the federal courts.
4. Fact-Finding on Federal Claims
Last term, in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, "' 4 the Court ruled that federal
habeas courts are bound by the record developed in any evidentiary
hearing conducted on the state level." 5 Thus, where a claim for federal
relief depends on the development of an independent evidentiary record,
a federal habeas court is not free to order a second or successive hearing
if the claim has already been litigated in state court." 6 Only if state
authorities impair the opportunity to fully litigate or develop necessary
112. 113 S. Ct. at 844 ("[R]espondent was not entitled to an objection based on 'double
counting.' Respondent therefore suffered no prejudice from his counsel's deficient performance.")
(emphasis added).
113. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring the defendant to show that counsel's performance
was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense).
114. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
115. Id. at 1719-20. This holding is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that
state fact findings "shall be presumed to be correct" unless the federal petitioner can bring the
case within a statutorily-authorized basis for further fact-finding. Federal habeas courts must
defer to state fact-finding even if the facts were found by a state appellate court, rather than at
the trial court level. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981).
116. 112 S. Ct. at 1719-21 (applying "cause and prejudice" test to claim of defective fact-
finding at state court level arguably warranting additional evidentiary hearing by federal habeas
court).
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evidence will a habeas court be authorized to open up the record to an
additional hearing to develop evidentiary facts." 7 Keeney overruled the
principle of Townsend v. Sain," 8 which had permitted development of
any necessary evidentiary record once a district court determined that
the petition for habeas relief asserted a substantial federal claim." 9
The practical impact of Keeney is to limit expenditure of federal
habeas court time in the conduct of evidentiary hearings. Because the
emerging principles of habeas corpus require state defendants to assert
their federal claims in available state proceedings, a defendant must
assert the right to an evidentiary hearing at the state level and develop
all necessary factual bases to support the claim if a hearing is ordered
by the state trial or post-conviction court. 20 Otherwise, the opportunity
to develop a factual record essential to demonstrate entitlement to'relief
on a federal claim may well be fatally compromised. 2' An absolute
denial of an evidentiary hearing by a state court probably affords the
most likely opportunity for a state defendant to obtain a comprehensive
evidentiary hearing once the jurisdiction of the federal habeas court
has been properly invoked.
C. The Scope of Review
Even assuming trial counsel has correctly preserved federal error and
all colorable federal claims have been resolved by state appellate and
post-conviction courts, federal habeas courts will not necessarily have
jurisdiction to consider all constitutional claims raised in the prosecu-
tion. Moreover, a flawed petition poses procedural impediments to
consideration of many federal claims that might otherwise have proven
meritorious.
1. Subject Matter Limitations
Although federal habeas corpus is a legislatively-created remedy, the
Court has had occasion to limit the lower federal courts' scope of
117. Id. at 1718-19. The majority recognized that additional fact-finding may be warranted
where state officials have impaired the accused's ability to properly develop a record for review
of federal claims. Id. at 1719-20.
118. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
119. Id. at 317.
120. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992).
121. The Keeney Court did recognize application of a limited exclusion to the rule of deference
to state fact-finding and default upon defendant's failure to properly pursue state fact-finding
opportunities when denial of an evidentiary hearing would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice, such as conviction of a factually innocent accused. 112 S. Ct. at 1721.
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review of federal claims in habeas litigation. 122 Clearly, Congress could
act to limit or expand habeas corpus jurisdiction, effectively imposing
on the Court either greater or more restrictive authority in tailoring the
remedy. 23
Conversely, the Court may also act to expand the jurisdiction of
federal habeas courts, as it arguably did this term in Herrera v.
Collins.2 4 There, the issue that had been raised in the district court
involved a petitioner's claim of his factual innocence of the capital
crime for which he had been convicted and sentenced to death. 125 The
claim was based on newly discovered evidence of incriminating admis-
sions made by his deceased brother, who claimed to have killed the
two police officers.' 26
The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing the stay of execution ordered by the
habeas court, concluded that Herrera had predicated his application on
a claim of "actual innocence," standing alone without any substantial
claim of violation of a federally protected right. 127 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Townsend v. Sain, 28 the Fifth Circuit
refused to recognize Herrera's actual innocence claim in federal habeas
corpus and vacated the stay of execution.
29
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision, 30
the concurring and dissenting opinions disclose that the majority favored
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment would prevent execution
122. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-82 (1976).
123. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
.124. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), affirming 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
125. Herrera's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas in Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1131 (1985). He subsequently unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in state court, Ex
parte Herrera, No. 12,828-02 ('rex. Crim. App., Aug. 2, 1985), and then challenged the use of
identification testimony at his trial in a federal habeas corpus action. Herrera v. Collins, 904
F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 307 (1990).
126. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869-70 (detailing inconsistencies that led the Justices to disbelieve
Herrera's new claim of innocence, including: (1) inconsistencies between the facts asserted in the
two affidavits Herrera offered to support his application for federal habeas relief and request for
stay of execution; (2) the inconsistency between Herrera's apparent admission of guilt in a letter
admitted at trial and his new claim of innocence; (3) conflicts between third party accounts in
the affidavits and the testimony accepted as accurate at Herrera's jury trial). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals had rejected this claim of innocence prior to the assertion in federal habeas.
Ex parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1074 (1992).
127. 954 F.2d at 1033-34.
128. 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (establishing that a claim of newly discovered evidence, by
itself, is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus).
129. 954 F.2d at 1033-34.
130. 113 S. Ct. at 870.
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of an actually innocent capital defendant.' 3 ' The majority, however,
concluded that Herrera's claim of innocence rested on insufficient
evidence that he was not involved in the murder, particularly in light
of the evidence adduced at trial, which included, most significantly, an
incriminating letter apparently written by Herrera himself. 32 The ma-
jority, moreover, looked to the executive clemency process as the proper
forum for asserting claims of actual innocence based on newly discov-
ered evidence,' rather than creating any procedural right to litigate
these claims in either the state 134 or federal courts.3 5 However, the
Court's awkward posture in disposing of Herrera suggests that rather
than reaffirming the absolute bar to review of actual innocence claims
in federal habeas,' 36 the Court now perceives the possibility of an
131. The concurring opinions of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, 113 S. Ct. at
874, and Justice White, 113 S. Ct. at 875, as well as the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun,
joined substantially by Justices Stevens and Souter, 113 S. Ct. at 876, all demonstrate support
for the proposition that execution of an innocent capital defendant would offend the Constitution.
Only Justice Scalia, joined in his concurrence by Justice Thomas, was willing to adhere to the
principle that claims of actual innocence are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus, even though
adhering to that principle could entail denying habeas jurisdiction that would prevent the execution
of an innocent defendant. 113 S. Ct. at 874-75.
132. 113 S. Ct. at 857-58 n.l.
133. 113 S. Ct. at 866-67.
134. Id. at 869-70. Justice O'Connor found the exact procedural context in which the case
arose particularly important. The federal district court entered a stay of execution to permit the
petitioner to apply for a post-conviction writ in the state trial court. 113 S. Ct. at 873. Justice
O'Connor observed that the federal district court did not order the state courts to entertain the
petitioner's newly-discovered-evidence claim on the merits as a matter of constitutional right, an
approach that she characterized as "extraordinary." Id. Yet, the Court itself could have held that
the Constitution mandates the state courts to consider newly discovered evidence claims, even
when the usual time limit for presentation of such claims has passed. See id. The majority opinion
notes that Arizona is one of numerous jurisdictions that limit the time frame for presenting claims
of newly discovered evidence. 113 S. Ct. at 865 n.8; Amz. R. CRim. PROC. 24.2(a)(1987) (providing
that a newly discovered evidence claim must be presented within sixty days of judgment).
135. 113 S. Ct. at 866. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, considered the
possibility that a claim of newly discovered evidence of actual innocence could be so factually
compelling as to warrant federal consideration. Id. at 864. He observed:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital
case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of
the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have
on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to
retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold
showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The
showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.
113 S. Ct. at 869.
136. Justice Scalia explained that he joined the majority opinion based on his bnderstanding
that the majority left intact the prohibition on federal habeas review of actual innocence claims
set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), despite the majority's consideration of
the hypothetical case of compelling evidence of a capital accused's innocence. 113 S. Ct. at 875.
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extraordinary factual circumstance in which the assertion of habeas
jurisdiction would be appropriate.
a. Fourth Amendment Claims
The Court has thus far limited habeas jurisdiction in terms of category
of claims only in the area of Fourth Amendment matters subject to
enforcement by application of the judicially-imposed rule of evidentiary
exclusion. In Stone v. Powell,'7 the Court held that federal habeas
jurisdiction would not lie to consider a claim that previously had been
fully and fairly litigated in the state courts. 3 " Because the remedy
imposed in Mapp v. Ohio' 39-application of the exclusionary rule-was
essentially judicially created, the Court's decision to limit review of
state court rulings may be seen as merely reflecting a rational limitation
on the reviewability of determinations that are meant to address specific
grievances in individual cases.
The practical effect of Stone v. Powell is two-fold: first, it necessarily
narrows the class of search and seizure claims eventually subject to
litigation in federal habeas courts; and second, it necessitates application
for review by writ of certiorari of those state court rulings that dispose
of Fourth Amendment claims adversely to defendants.' 40 The post-Stone
v. Powell history of Fourth Amendment litigation demonstrates contin-
uing consideration of the role of privacy, the scope of power granted
to law enforcement officials, and the application of the exclusionary
rule, although a significant body of that case law has been produced
by prosecution-sponsored applications for Supreme Court review.141
137. 428 U.S. at 465.
138. Id. at 493-94.
139. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
140. See 428 U.S. at 492-93, 480-82. Stone v. Powell substantially limits federal review of
claims arising under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 480-82. Nevertheless, state defendants
retain the right to petition to the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari for review of an adverse
holding by a state appellate court once the defendants have exhausted avenues for review in the
state courts on direct appeal. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-89 (1980) (holding
warrantless intrusion into suspect's house to effect arrest improper absent exigent circumstances).
141. In the aftermath of Stone, most Fourth Amendment questions ultimately resulting in
resolution by the Supreme Court have been brought by prosecutors challenging state court decisions
ordering exclusion of seized evidence. E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388-89 (1991)
(upholding police request for consent to search passengers or luggage on bus); California v.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (holding police may search unopened container found in
vehicle); Riverside County, California v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1991) (holding delay
of 48 hours in bringing arrestee before magistrate not per se unreasonable); California v. Hodari,
111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991) (holding fleeing suspect not seized until caught, and property disposed
of by fleeing suspect not seized, but abandoned); Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints conducted pursuant to articulated
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b. Miranda Violation Claims
The Court has yet to limit review of claims generated by its other
principal prophylactic rule imposed upon state proceedings-the rule
governing provision of counsel and conduct of interrogation in Miranda
v. Arizona.142 However, the Court did consider this question this term
in Withrow v. Williams, holding 5-4 not to preclude review of Miranda
claims in federal habeas. 4 The split decision reflects dissenting opinions
authored by Justices O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who favored preclusion of consideration of Miranda claims in federal
habeas actions, 44 and Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, who wrote in
support of general deference to state disposition of federal claims which
follow full and fair opportunity to litigate the calim.145
standards); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (holding anonymous tip corroborated by
observation of details sufficient to justify stop); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1990)
(holding that officers may search areas of home of arrested suspect to extent necessary to protect
against sudden attack); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (observing defendant's
property from helicopter did not result in unconstitutional invasion of privacy); Michigan v.
Chester, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (holding that suspect fleeing from police who have taken no
action to stop or arrest is not seized when he disposes of cocaine within view of officers);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1988) (holding no expectation of privacy in opaque
plastic garbage bags left for pickup outside curtilage of home); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
359-60 (1987) (holding good faith exception to exclusionary rule extended to officers acting
pursuant to state statute subsequently declared unconstitutional); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79, 88 (1987) (holding reasonable belief in accuracy of address by officers obtaining search warrant
based on inaccurate description excuses error, and suppression of evidence not required); Colorado
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374-76 (1987) (holding inventory search of closed container in impounded
auto did not violate Fourth Amendment); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985)
(holding that motor home being used for travel subject to automobile exceptions to warrant
requirement); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1984) (holding consent to search not rendered
invalid because suspect not advised he could refuse); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981,
990 (1984) (holding mistake by judge who issued search warrant does not compel suppression of
evidence); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984) (holding right to search automobile stopped
on highway continues despite impoundment); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983)
(upholding search of suspect's shoulder bag as inventory pursuant to arrest upheld); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-42 (1983) (applying "totality of circumstances" test in determining
lawfulness of search and seizure); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) (holding valid
arrest of persons recently in vehicle affords grounds for search of passenger compartment); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976) (holding inventory search of auto impounded
for traffic infraction proper to protect owner's property).
142. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
143. No. 91-1030, 1993 WL 119753 (U.S., decided April 21, 1993). The Court granted certiorari
to review a Sixth Circuit decision. 112 S. Ct. 1664 (1992), granting cert. to 944 F.2d 284 (6th
Cir. 1991).
144. No. 91-1030, 1993 WL 119753, at *11. Justice O'Connor had earlier taken the position
that a Stone v. Powell-type rule of preclusion should be applied to federal habeas review of
claims predicated on Miranda violations. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 205 (1989).
145. 1993 WL 119753, at *20. Justice Scalia had joined in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. at 205, in arguing for preclusion of Miranda-based claims in
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Criminal defense counsel must be aware of any future limitation on
federal habeas jurisdiction comparable to that imposed in Stone v.
Powell to properly advise state court clients on appropriate procedural
options available in the event their federal constitutional claims are
rejected at the state trial and post-conviction stages of the process.
Should the Court act on the invitation to exclude Miranda-based claims
from habeas corpus, counsel must be aware and accordingly advise
state defendants that federal review likely will be either totally precluded
or seriously limited, suggesting the need to file for certiorari on poten-
tially meritorious claims.
2. Limitations on Retroactivity
Even if the habeas court has jurisdiction to consider the subject
matter of a state petitioner's claim, some petitioners will nevertheless
be deprived of relief because their claims either were not pending on
direct appeal or were not properly preserved when the United States
Supreme Court generated a favorable rule. In Teague v. Lane,'"4 the
Court adopted a two-fold test for retroactivity when new rules are
announced. Rules are "new" if existing precedent does not dictate the
result; when it is debatable whether precedent dictates the result, the
announcement of a new principle constitutes a "new rule."
47
First, the Court held that new rules in the area of criminal procedure
generally apply only to those cases in which an issue controlled by the
new precedent are pending at the time the favorable rule is announced.'"
Second, the new rules may apply if they implicate fundamental due
process protections. 49 The application of Teague itself is difficult,
because the Court has subsequently concluded that "new" rules are
applicable if they should have been anticipated by state courts as a
result of reasonable readings of precedent or obvious trends in the
development of the law. 50
federal habeas corpus. His concurrence in Withrow v. Williams reflects a more general notion of
limitation based upon federal habeas court deference to state court conclusions of law. This
approach is consistent with his position in Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2486-91 (1992),
joining Justice Thomas in observing that federal habeas tradition would not necessarily militate
against adoption of a standard of review predicated on deference to state court determinations
of law, as well as fact. See infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text (discussing Wright v. West).
146. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
147. Id. at 301. A result is dictated by precedent when it is not "susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
148. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310; see also Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1135 (1992).
149. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307; see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that
Eighth Amendment requirement that capital sentencing jury consider claim of defendant's mental
retardation in considering sentence constitutes new rule, but falls within exception to "new rule"
non-retroactivity doctrine).
150. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1138-40.
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Consequently, the likelihood that a federal habeas court will afford
relief on an issue subject to continuing litigation turns both on the
interpretation it gives to newly emerging precedent pursuant to Teague
and on proper preservation of the claim. The Court's decision in Allen
v. Hardy,'5' demonstrates application of the "new" rule analysis. In
Hardy, the state trial and appellate courts rejected the petitioner's claim
that his trial jury had been improperly constituted because of the
prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to remove
minority venirepersons from his trial jury. 5 2 The petitioner had relied
on the Court's prior holding in Swain v. Alabama,'53 which required a
state criminal defendant to demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory use
of peremptories by the state to establish an Equal Protection Claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 4 Having failed to meet the eviden-
tiary burden imposed in Swain, the petitioner then sought to rely on
the more favorable rule of Batson v. Kentucky,' 5 which overruled
Swain as to both the evidentiary standard and the standard of proof
required to establish a violation based on prosecutorial use of peremp-
tory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion.'5 6 The Court ex-
pressly held that the "new rule" announced in Batson relating to proof
of discriminatory exercise of peremptory strikes would only apply to
Batson claims pending on direct appeal at the time the Batson decision
was issued, and not to claims initially made collaterally in post-convic-
tion proceedings. 5 7 Subsequently, the Court held that the Batson rule
would be available to all claims pending review on direct appeal at the
time Batson was announced.5 8
Significantly, an Arizona petitioner may seek state post-conviction
relief on the ground that a "new" rule, or favorable change in law
following his conviction and affirmance on direct appeal, should be
applied for his benefit in the interest of justice.'5 9
151. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
152. Id. at 256 (citing People v. Alien, 422 N.E.2d 100, 104 (I11. Ct. App. 1981)).
153. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
154. Hardy, 478 U.S. at 256.
155. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
156. Hardy, 478 U.S. at 258-59.
157. Id. at 257-59. Certainly, petitioner Allen sought to rely on Batson without delay; in fact,
the decision was issued denying relief in his case on June 30, 1986, just two months following
the Court's historic holding in Batson on April 30, 1986.
158. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that Batson claims pending on direct
appeal at time of Batson decision are subject to application of rule against discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges).
159. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g) permits the petitioner to seek retroactive
application of a significant change in the law that, if applicable at the time of trial, probably
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3. Procedural Bars to Federal Habeas Review
Apart from the impact of Court-imposed limitations on review of
specific claims and application of new rules, at least three important
procedural rules may serve to preclude determination of the merits of
federal claims presented in habeas corpus proceedings. These rules relate
to inclusion of unexhausted claims in the petition, procedurally de-
faulted claims, and claims presented in successive petitions.
a. Unexhausted Claims
One problem typically encountered in federal habeas actions is the
tendency of pro se litigants and well-intentioned counsel to present
claims not previously litigated in state courts. This problem may well
result from deliberate strategic concerns on the part of counsel that a
federal forum will prove more favorable than a state forum for con-
sideration of federal claims, but the controlling statute' 60 and case
authority 6' require exhaustion of available state remedies before a
habeas court may reach these claims. The State may plead failure of
exhaustion defensively in opposition to the federal petition, and petitions
presenting unexhausted claims or so-called "mixed petitions," contain-
ing some claims that have been exhausted and some unexhausted claims,
are subject to dismissal upon timely motion by the State. 62 Upon
dismissal, counsel may assert the unexhausted claims in state post-
conviction actions or elect to refile and proceed only upon exhausted
claims. 163
b. Procedurally Defaulted Claims
As noted earlier, once a state court applies the bar of procedural
default under state law to federal claims, that bar will serve to preclude
would have had the result of overturning his conviction or sentence. State v. Slemmer, 823 P.2d
41, 46-51 (Ariz. 1991) (defining scope of court's authority under Rule 32.1(g) and adopting federal
retroactivity analysis).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) mandate exhaustion of available state remedies (unless further
litigation would prove futile) before presentation of federal claims by application for federal writ
of habeas corpus.
161. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (holding that federal district court will not
grant a writ of habeas corpus unless all state remedies have been exhausted).
162. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987) (holding State is under duty to plead
defendant's failure to exhaust state remedies, but failure to plead affords both habeas court and
reviewing court discretion to consider federal claims on the merits).
163. See United States ex rel. Winters v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 nn. 11-13
(N.D. Ill. 1983); United States ex rel. Winters v. Mizell, 644 F. Supp. 782, 785-86 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (refiling of petition for habeas corpus relief after court in Winters v. DeRobertis dismissed
original petition to allow defendant to exhaust state court remedies).
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litigation of the issues on federal habeas.' 64 The practical impact of
Coleman v. Thompson is thus to encourage state appellate and post-
conviction courts to apply the bar of procedural default, rather than
considering the merits of federal claims, to avoid relitigation of the
claims in federal court. If the state court proceeds to dispose of the
federal issues on the merits, the decision on the merits effectively
overrides any claim of procedural default that might otherwise have
proved successful to bar the subsequent federal litigation. 65
c. Successive Petitions
In two recent decisions, the Court has limited the circumstances under
which a federal habeas court may consider claims raised in successive
or repetitive petitions for relief.'6 A federal habeas court may consider
claims raised in a successive petition upon a showing of cause and
prejudice explaining the failure to raise the claim in a prior petition,
or if a claim of constitutional error is accompanied by a showing of
the defendant's actual innocence of the crime of which he has been
convicted in state court, as the Court held in McCleskey v. Zant167
Similarly, in Sawyer v. Whitley,16 1 the Court held that, in a capital
case, a federal habeas court may consider claims raised in a successive
petition upon a showing that the defendant who has been sentenced to
death was effectively "innocent" of an aggravating circumstance alleged
by the prosecution and ultimately found by the sentencer to be sup-
ported by evidence and, thus, supportive of the capital sentence im-
posed. 69 Otherwise, the Court has held that a state defendant is entitled
to present only a single petition for relief to the federal courts, 70
imposing upon counsel the duty to make certain that all colorable
federal claims are presented in the first, and presumably only, petition
for federal habeas corpus relief the defendant will be entitled to file.
164. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, Ill S. Ct. 2590, 2596 (1991) (rejecting Ninth Circuit reliance
on presumption of reviewability of federal claims where state supreme court decision fails to
address claim in post-conviction action, but prior state appellate decision held claim procedurally
defaulted without reaching merits).
165. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985).
166. McCleskey v. Zant, III S. Ct. 1454, 1470-71 (1991); Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514,
2518-19 (1992).
167. 111 S. Ct. at 1470.
168. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
169. See id. at 2521-22.
170. See id. at 2518; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454-55 (1986) (holding
successive petitions presenting identical claims as those previously raised and decided on merits
must be dismissed).
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D. Standard of Review
Once a federal habeas court asserts jurisdiction over a petition
presenting exhausted and procedurally non-defaulted claims, the court
will proceed to dispose of the issues raised on the basis of the available
record and any additional fact-finding necessitated by the state court's
failure to afford the petitioner an adequate opportunity to develop the
record. 7 1 The standard for review of these claims is a critical component
in the balancing of federal and state judicial interests in habeas corpus. 72
Although the language of the statute requires deference to state fact-
finding in this process,'7 the statute does not direct the habeas court
to accord similar deference to state findings or conclusions of law.
Instead, the Court has traditionally held that mixed questions of law
and fact, Such as the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession,
are to be assessed by the habeas court independently of any prior state
court determination. 74
The right to de novo review of federal habeas claims was challenged
this past term in Wright v. West. 75 There, the state argued that the
federal courts should defer to reasonable interpretations of federal law
made by state appellate and post-conviction courts. 176 The Fourth Circuit
had rejected the sufficiency of evidence supporting a theft conviction. 77
The prosecution had relied, in part, on application of the traditional
unexplained, possession-of-recently-stolen-property presumption. 78 The
171. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1720-21.
172. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2498 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977), provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and
the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to
be correct....
(emphasis added). The statute then sets forth a number of exceptions to this general rule of
deference. See id.
174. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985).
175. 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2489-91 (1992).
176. The Court directed the parties to specifically consider and argue the issue:
In determining whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, should a federal court give
deference to the state court's application of law to the specific facts of the petitioner's
case or should it review the state court's determination de novo?
112 S. Ct. 672, 672 (1991). The directive was issued on December 18, two days after the petition
for writ of certiorari was granted. 112 S. Ct. 656, 656 (1991).
177. West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 1991).
178. Id. at 268.
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Fourth Circuit held that the minimal constitutional threshhold for
evidentiary sufficiency could not be met by reliance on this presump-
tion. 179
The Supreme Court reversed in a fragmented decision, with all justices
in agreement that the Fourth Circuit was simply incorrect in its major
premise. 80 However, Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sc'alia, speculated on the propriety of
adopting a deferential standard of review in federal habeas actions,
providing that state court determinations would not be disturbed by
federal courts as long as they were reasonable in their conclusions, even
if incorrect.' 8'
The Thomas position drew spirited challenges from Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, 82 and from Justice Ken-
nedy,'83 who wrote separately to affirm the principle of de novo review
in federal habeas actions. The separate concurrences of Justices White'8
and Souter8 5 did not address this tangential issue and did not reveal
their positions on deferential versus de novo review, leaving final
resolution of this issue open. 18 6
However, this term the Court has dramatically altered the burden of
proving a constitutional violation warranting relief from a state court
conviction in a federal habeas action. In Brecht v. Abrahamson,187
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five member majority, concluded
that the proper test for determining whether state court trial error
warrants federal habeas relief is whether the error "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' 88 In so
179. See id. at 268-70 (relying on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), which set
forth the constitutional test for sufficiency of evidence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
each element of the offense, when viewed from the perspective of a rational trier of fact).
180. 112 S. Ct. at 2493. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. See id.
at 2493. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurred in the judgment.
See id. Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurrence. See id. at 2498.
181. See id. at 2486-91.
182. See id. at 2493-98.
183. See id. at 2498-2500.
184. See id. at 2493.
185. See id. at 2500-03.
186. This issue was again raised during the current term in Withrow v. Williams, 1993 WL
119753. The majority noted that it had limited its consideration of the case to the Miranda-
preclusion issue, id. at *10 n.2, but Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented and
expressed their preference for a rule of general federal habeas court deference to state court
dispositions of federal claims. Id. at *21; see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
187. No. 91-7358, 1993 WL 119795 (U.S., decided April 21, 1993), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991).
188. Id. at *12 (following the test applied in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
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holding, the majority rejected continued reliance for federal habeas
corpus purposes on the "harmless error" test of Chapman v. Califor-
nia,1 9 which requires reversal of a state court conviction infected by
constitutional trial error unless the error is shown to be "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 90
Brecht leaves intact application of the Chapman test for harmless
error in review on direct appeal. 191 However, the application of a more
rigorous test in the review of federal habeas claims poses certain
problems for habeas litigants and counsel. First, it necessarily means
that direct review in state appellate courts offers substantially greater
prospects for success, assuming these courts faithfully perform the
harmless error analysis demanded by Chapman. Once the case reaches
federal court by application for habeas relief, the entitlement to relief
requires a showing of what amounts to "actual prejudice" instead of
the presumed prejudice which underlies the Chapman rule.
Second, because Brecht essentailly shifts the burden to the habeas
applicant, proof of the constitutional violation alone will be insufficient
to ensure relief. Rather, counsel must be prepared to demonstrate a
sound theory of prejudice to the habeas court in making the case for
relief. This heightened burden for obtaining federal relief increases the
need for state court trial counsel to lay the foundation for subsequent
habeas attack by formulating and advancing the theoretical bases for
claims of prejudice when they may not otherwise be apparent from the
record. At a minimum, development of the theory of prejudice in the
federal forum, accompanied by necessary supporting fact-finding, pri-
776 (1946)). The Seventh Circuit had distinguished review of violations of prophylactic rules from
review of violations of fundamental protected rights and concluded that a more rigorous test of
prejudice might properly be applied to consideration of the former by federal habeas courts. 944
F.2d at 1374. The claim involved improper prosecutorial comment on the accused's post-arrest
silence which followed police advisement of Miranda warnings. Impeachment with this post-arrest
silence in this circumstance violates the Fifth Amendment under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
617-18 (1976), unlike consideration of post-arrest silence when the warnings have not been given.
See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982). The Brecht majority, unlike the Seventh Circuit,
did not distinguish between violations of prophylactic rules and violations of fundamental rights
in evaluating Doyle. Consequently, the holding in Brecht is not limited to claims involving
violations of prophylactic rules. No. 91-7358, 1993 WL 119795, at *6-7. Instead, the opinion
announces a rule generally applicable to claims that state court trial error has compromised
constitutional guarantees. Id. at *7.
189. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
190. Id at 24.
191. No. 91-7358, 1993 WL 119795, at *8. For example, in Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court
applied the Chapman formulation to review, on direct appeal, the admission of a coerced
confession. See 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1257 (1991).
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marily at the state level, 192 will ultimately prove essential to preserving
the federal constitutional claim for habeas review. Brecht thus raises
the stakes for constitutional litigation conducted in the federal habeas
forum and demands greater attention to theory and record-making from
state trial counsel.
E. Conclusion
Effective representation of federal habeas petitioners now involves
more than competent performance in the federal action itself. The most
effective representation at this stage of a convicted state defendant's
challenge may readily be compromised by counsel's failure during a
state trial, on direct appeal, and during state post-conviction proceed-
ings.
To preserve the client's right to seek federal review and avoid the
claim of constitutional ineffectiveness that may afford relief from state
procedural default, state counsel must properly preserve the record on
federal constitutional claims by making timely objections on the record;
developing correct theories of error and asserting emerging principles
of law; and, when appropriate, fully developing facts to support federal
claims in evidentiary hearings when afforded by state courts. Otherwise,
the current state of federal habeas law not only invites, but virtually
demands in many instances, investigation of state counsel's performance
and competence preparatory to assertion of an ineffective assistance
claim.
Thus, proper representation in state proceedings ultimately rewards
counsel, as well as the client, once meritorious constitutional claims are
raised for federal review. Adequate preservation of these claims facili-
tates review on the merits without reliance on accompanying assertions
of ineffectiveness to properly invoke the habeas jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
192. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text for consideration of the impact of Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
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